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In the Stt pre IDe Court of the 
State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N. A., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respoodent, 
vs. 
EDWARD H. BATES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 9926 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to annul and set aside a deed on the 
basis that there was no present, absolute and nnconditional 
delivery of the deed to the grantee during the grantor's 
lifetime; and that the deed was testamentary in character 
and, therefore, inoperative because it was not executed in 
accordance with the Statute of Wills. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. FTom a judgment 
by the District Court in favor of the plaintiff, defendant 
appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although there is no dispute as to the facts elicited 
at trial, nevertheless, the appellant's Statement of Fact 
does nort completely and correctly state those facts. For 
that reason the respondent feels compelled to set forth 
some importnt facts not stated by the appellant. In order 
to keep the sequence straight and to eliminate the neces-
sity of ;referring from the appellant's brief to the respond-
ent's brief in order to determine what the facts are, the re~­
spondent will therefore restate the facts. 
Willis Bates, the decedent, was an old friend of Thel-
ma Vest Smurthwaite, then known as Thelma Vest. For 
the purpose of this fact statement, Mrs. Smurthwaite will 
be referred to as Thelma Vest throughout the recitation. 
Miss Vest 'had known Willis Bates for ten years prior to 
January, 1949, and referred to him as a dear friend of 
the family (R. 60-61). Mr. Bates was a bachelor and took 
his meals at the Vest Restaurant in Payson, eating there 
in the presence of Miss Vest three times a day. Prior to 
January, 1951, Miss Vest was a school teacher, however, 
in November of 1950 she was elected Utah COunty Recor-
der and is presently Utah County Recorder (R. 59). Thel-
ma Vest was a Notary Public in January of 1949. On 
Januacy 14, 1949, Willis Bates was a masonry contractor. 
He., at that time, owned the home in question in Payson, 
Utah, many items of personal property, two autobobiles, 
one touring car and a ton and a half truck. 
On J.anuary 14, 1949, Mr. Bates, while at the restau-
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rant of the parents of Miss Vest, had a conversation with 
Miss Vest. The substance of the conversation is set forth 
as follows: 
"A. Mr. Bates came to me and said, "Thelma, I have 
received a telephone call from California offering me 
employment." And, he said, "I have always wanted 
to get out of this cold weather." He said, "It is pleas-
ant weather down there and good working conditions, 
and so I am leaving immediately." He said, "I am 
hesitant about going." He said, "I hate to leave my 
home." He had just built a little new home. He said, 
"If anything happens to me, I would want my brother 
Ted to have the home." He said, "We are in a spot 
in Payson right now, there is no attorney here". He 
said," Mr. McMullin has died". Mr. Hodgson at that 
time had not come to town. Mr. R. A. Porter had 
gone and left to make a livelihood somewhere else. 
He said, "Could you help me?" I said, "I am Notary 
Public". He said, "Could you help me make the deed 
in the event that anything happened to me that Ted 
could have my home". He said, "I have done much 
for Lewis, who is the Principal of the High School". 
He said, "I educated Walter". He said, "I have never 
done much for Ted and he is the baby of the family''. 
He said, "I have always felt compassionate towards 
Ted and I have always felt that I would like to do 
more for him if I ever was in a position to do it". He 
said, ''He is married and has had kind of a rough time.'' 
So he said, "If you will help me with this, I will ap-
preciate it". He said, "Then if you would hold this 
for me, I will appreciate that too". He said, "In the 
event anything ,happens to me, you give it to Ted, but 
I don't want Ted to know that you 'have this document 
unless something happens to me." He said, "That is 
just our secret." 
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I said, "Willis, I will be glad to help you". It was 
all on the spur of the moment this evening and he was 
going to leave the next morning or by midnight to 
drive to the coast to immediately get ready to accept 
the appointment by the first of the week, and it was 
all a suddenness at that time." 
Miss Vest prepared the deed to the house and she also 
prepared, at the decedent's request, a bill of sale to one 
Oldsmobile touring ear, one Chevrolet ton and a half truck, 
and to all personal property belonging to the decedent (Ex-
hibit 2.). 
One of the documents prepared by Miss Vest for the 
decedent on January 14, 1949, which is not in evidence 
and was apparently destro~ed after the death of the de-
cedent, was a power of attorney. Miss Vest testified that 
the purpose of this instrument was as follows: 
"A. Yes, there was a bill of sale and a power of at-
torney so that if anything happened to him, that I 
could get the papers and tell Ted aJbout it, it was crude-
ly drawn up. It was to tell Ted where the keys to 
the safety deposit box were so Ted could get the keys 
and get what he might have there." 
After January 14, 1949, the decedent sold the Olds-
mobile referred to in the bill of sale and purchased a 1958 
Cadillac (R. 98). The decedent further retained posses-
sion of all of his other personal property, occupied the 
premises, and paid taxes thereon from the date the docu-
ments were made until his death on January 21, 1962. 
In September of 1956 the first wife of the defendant 
died. In 1960 he remarried and was later divorced. 
On two occasions Miss Vest left the State and returned 
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the documents to the decedent with comments, the sub-
stance of which are as follows: 
"Willis, I am going away. I would not want to take 
this with me. Perhaps if I leave them they will get 
destroyed. I thnik you better take care of these until 
I return.'' 
In 1960 when the decedent learned that Edward had 
married he came to Miss Vest and had a conversation in 
the restaurant again: 
"A. Yes, he said, "Thelma". I said, "Yes". He said, 
'Are you busy?" I said, 'Not too busy". He said, 
"Could I talk to you?" He said, "I am quite concerned 
over this marriage of Ted's". I said, "Yes, I heard 
Ted got married''. He said, You know, I thought about 
the deeds. I want Ted and those children to have that 
home, but", he said, "I would not want that woman 
or any of her kin or her family to have one sand of 
one brick of any part of that place". He said, "It is 
for Ted and those motherless children". I said, "Wil-
lis, you know, if you feel that way, I think it might 
be a good idea for you to go around the comer and 
have Mr. Hodgson, he is just around the comer from 
where you live, the attorney-at-law, and it is very con-
venient. If I were you, I would go and have him draw 
you up a letter as to what you would like done". He 
said, "Well, I have been awful upset over this". He 
said, "'If anything happens to me," he said, "I would 
want Ted to record the deed and then I would want 
the children to have the home". So, I just passed it 
off at that time after I mentioned it might be well 
for him to go and talk to Mr. Hodgson.'' 
Sometime later he had another conversation with Miss 
Vest which apparently took place at the same location but 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
after the divorce between the defendant and his wife. The 
conversation was as follows: 
"Finally, one day I saw him and he said, "I feel bet-
te·r". HJe said, "Ted is getting a divorce from the wo-
man, do you know that?" I said, "No I don't". He 
said, "Thank the Lord he is not going to live with her, 
he has seen the light". I had nothing against the wo-
man myself, so far as that is concerned. It is their 
business and I knew her and I knew her family. They 
are fine people but, he said, "I am glad he is getting 
a divorce". So he said, "I am ·happy about it". He 
said, "We will leave things like they are, I feel re-
lieved" * * * (R. 68). 
Matters remained fairly constant from 1960 to Jan-
uary of 1962, at which time Mr. Willis Bates went to the 
hospital for an operation. .Apparently he did not believe 
he was going to die, but nevertheless wanted to have a 
conversation with Miss Vest (then Mrs. Smurthwaite) con-
cerning the deed. The conversation was as follows: 
"A. He said, "Thelma, I am glad to see you and I 
am glad you came''. He said, ''You know how I feel 
about my ·home', and I said, "Yes, Willis, I do". He 
said, "I want Ted to record the deed when I am gone''. 
He said, ''I want you to deliver the deed to Ted and 
I want Ted, if he has not severed 1his relationships with 
Dora or this woman, I want you to have Ted make a 
deed to those motherless children". I said, "Are you 
sure they are 1completely divorced?" He said, "Ted 
tells me ~he is". He said, "One never knows." He 
said, "The home is for Ted and his kids", and he also 
said at the same time, I was crying, I was quite touched. 
I said, "You are not going to die, Willis, what is the 
matter, you should not take such a negative attitude". 
He said, "Of course I am not, but one needs to be pre-
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pared. U one has desires and wishes, he likes to see 
then1 carried out". He said, "I have that faith and 
confidence and trust in you". He said, "Of course, 
I have a job that I have got to go to". And, he said, 
"I have to get well". And he said, "They are going 
to open me up right here". (indicated) He said, "It 
is the same thing that Lewis and Walter had". He 
said, "It is going to rupture if I go on". He said, "This 
is a simple operation, there is nothing to worry about''. 
He said, "They are putting a plastic tube in here (in-
dicated.) , and I will be as good as new". I said, "You 
mean you are going on construction with a plastic tube 
in you?" He said, "Heavens yes, I will be ready to 
a lot of things by then". I said, "In March?" He 
said, I will be down on the lake catching catfish and 
bass". He said, 
I will be down there with Bert one of these days'', 
and we laughed about that." * * * (R. 69) 
"Q. Did he say anything about making a deed 
from Ted to the chHdTen? 
A. Yes, ·he said that he would like Ted to make 
a deed to Rose Mary. He said, "Rose Mary is not 
well". He said, "If it takes every penny that I have 
left, I want that little girl made well, if it takes every 
penny I ·have left.'' 
Q. What did he say about making the deed to 
Rose Mary? 
A. He said, "I would like Ted to record the deed 
and make a deed to Rose Mary and Joe, Ted's mother-
less children". 
Q. Did he say for you to see that be did so? 
A. He told me to instruct Ted to that effect. 
Q. Didn't ·he say anything about it to this ef-
fect, "You promise me or see that ·he does that?" 
A. He said, "I want you to see that Ted makes 
a deed, you will give the deed to Ted and then tell 
Ted I want him to make a deed to the kids''. 
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Q. You weren't to give the deed to him unless 
you got assurance that he did so or made a deed from 
him to the children? 
A. I was to give the deed to Ted and have him 
record it and then make a deed to the children." 
The facts stated above are the sequence of the con-
versation between the decedent and Miss Vest, however, 
Miss Vest, throughout the transcript, made orther state-
ments as to what was said at the time the various conver-
sations related a~bove took place. 
For example, referring to the time when the defendant had 
remarried, counsel for the plaintiff asked Miss Vest as 
follovvs: 
"Q. He wanted to change the deed when Ted re-
married? 
A. He mentioned to me the fact that he wanted 
the deed made to the children when Ted remarried. 
He still wanted Ted and his children to have the home. 
Q. He wanted it to go to Ted's children when he 
remarried? 
A. Yes." (R. 72) 
In referring to the conversation in the Veterans Hos-
pital, Miss Vest testified as follows: 
"Q. He wanted Ted's children to have this place, 
did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was his last wish? 
A. Yes, that Ted's children have the place es-
pecially the one that was an invalid, I shouldn't say 
invalid, she is not an invalid, she is ill. She had a 
nervous breakdown, but she is better now." 
Q. And at that time he w·anted her to have it 
because of her illness. 
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"A. He wanted the children, she and the boy to 
have the home, never the girl alone. He made the 
statement, "If it took every penny that I ·have, I would 
like to see the little girl made well". Ted's wife died 
from cancer, just a very slow edging death and it was 
terrible on Ted and on her and her family.'' (R. 73) 
The Court was concerned about the relationship be-
tween the decedent and Miss Vest. Testimony concerning 
whether she was escrow holder for the grantee of the deed 
and bill of sale, or whether she was merely custodian for 
safe keeping and an agent of the grantor, was elicited from 
Miss Vest. Her testimony in this respect was as follows: 
"Q. You gave them back to him and he could 
have kept them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't call him up and tell 'him to bring 
the papers back? 
A. No, several times I felt like giving them back, 
they were quite a concern at times. I ·worried about 
them sometimes, but then I felt like he trusted the 
papers with me. 
Q. If he had asked for them at any time, he 
could have had them? 
A. I would have ·handed them to him if he ;had 
wanted to keep them. 
Q. You would have given them to ~him at any 
time? 
A. You bet, I would have been glad to give them 
to him if he had wanted them. I felt that he had con-
fidence and trust and faith in me and wanted me to 
keep the papers. 
Q. You understood that if he had wanted them 
back, he could have had them back? 
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A. Yes definitely. 
Q. Did he understand that to your knowledge? 
A. Oh yes, he must have done, those were his 
papers." (R. 75) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE VALIDITY OF 
A DEED NOT IN THiE POSSESSION O·F THE GRAN-
TEE AT THE DEATH O·F THE GRANTO·R IS UPON 
THE CO·NTESTANT. 
The appellant ·has cited the case of Chamberlain v. 
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355, as authority for the 
proposition that the burden of proving non-delivery is up-
on the plaintiff. Under the circumstances of the Cham-
berlain case, the respondent would not dispute that state-
ment of law. The Chamberlain case, however, is not in 
point fr.om a f,actual standpoint. In the Chamberlain case, 
there had been a delivery to the grantee prior to death. 
The grantor and the grantee, in the Chamberlain case, were 
both elderly sisters who resided together. In that case, 
both the grantor and the grantee went to a Mr. Fletcher, 
a Notary Public, and the grantor requested him to make 
1ih.e deed in question. The grantor did most of the talking 
and stated, in the presence of the grantee, that she wanted 
the grantee to have the property. The grantor and the 
grantee ~had a safety deposit box in their joint name at 
Zions Savings Bank and Trust Company. When the deed 
was made it was placed by the grantor in the joint safety 
deposit box of the grantor and gmntee. Mter the death 
of the grantor it was taken by the grantee and recorded. 
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In that case the statement of the court that the burden 
of proving non-delivery was upon the plaintiff since the 
grantee had possession of the deed, both before and after 
the death of the grantor. 
The law is different, however, where the grantee does 
not have possession of the deed at the death of the gran-
tor. The rule in that instance is the opposite. That rule 
is expressed in the case of Alexander vs. American Bible 
Society, et al., 94 NE 2d 833. The facts in that case are 
as follows: 
William H. Mason and Annie M. Mason were the own-
ers of certain property. Both ·were 88 and 92 years of age 
respectively. On February 5, 1945, they executed two 
warranty deeds, one conveying to the American Bible So-
ciety the West half of the land in Section 29, and the oth-
er conveying to Blackburn University the six acre tract 
in Section 22. After making the deed they delivered the 
deeds to Russell Younger, who testified that in the month 
of February, 1945, he called at the Mason ·home at the 
request of Mr. Mason, who in the presence of Mrs. Ma-
son, handed him the two envelopes and at that time Mr. 
Mason stated in substance: 
"Here is two envelopes. The instructions are writ-
ten on the outside and when we die you follow the 
in...~ctions on the envelopes." 
He further testified that except for the instructions 
on the back of the envelopes containing the deeds he never 
at any time received any other directions or instructions 
from either Mr. or Mrs. Mason concerning the deeds and 
that after delivery to him of the envelopes, Mr. Mason nor 
his wife ever mentioned the matter to him. Younger tes-
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tified that he placed the envelopes containing the deeds 
in one of the drawers in the vault of the Shelby Loan and 
Trust Company. He was an officer of Shelby Loan and 
Trust Company, and that the deeds remained there until 
after the death of Mr. and Mrs. Mason and that this draw-
er where the deeds were kept was not accessable to any-
one other than the officers and emplo~ees of the bank. 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Mr. and Mrs. Mason, in depositing the 
envelopes containing the deeds with Younger established 
an intent to place the deeds beyond recall or control and 
with a present intent to immediately convey a future in-
terest in the lands. 
HELD: 
It appears that after Younger received the envelopes 
containing the deeds they were never in the possession of 
the grantors and that they never could have obtained pos-
session thereof without obtaining at least the permission 
of Younger or some orther officer or employee of the bank, 
since the grantors did not have access to the vault in which 
the deeds were held. 
"Where a deed is merely left with a third person for 
safekeeping, to be taken care of, and the grantor has 
the power of recall, the deed has not been legally de--
livered even thot1g1h the deed remains with the third 
person until after the grantor's death and is then re-
corded. (Authorities) Likewise, if the grantor de-
livers the deed to a third party without any direction 
as to delivery to the grantee, the deed is invalid. (Au-
thorities) If the grantor merely places the deed in 
the hands of a third person for safekeeping or as a 
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convenient place for deposit, the deed is not validly 
delivered and conveys no title. (Authorities)." 
"ln&~rnu<·h as the deeds were not in the possession of 
the grantees at the time of grantor's death, the bur-
den then fell upon the grantees to prove that the gran-
tc.rs had made an effectual legal delivery of the deeds 
beyond their possession, control and dominion and 
without the right to recall the same o;r change the dis-
position thereof." 
(Emphasis added) 
"While the intention of the grantors in the case at bar 
is meritorious and one would expect that because of 
their previous experiences in life they would desire 
that organizations such as the American Bible So-
ciety and Blackburn University would benefit from 
their worldly possessions, the law has prescribed cer-
tain plain rules to be observed in the execution of doc-
uments by which the title to real property is trans-
ferred, and while in this case the intention of the par-
ties may fail, the court cannot o~e long established 
rules of law governing the transfer of real property 
in this state, which have been established for the ben-
efit of the public at large and the violation of which 
would tend to render titles to real estate unstable and 
uncertain." 
"We hold that there was no proof that these deeds were 
validly delivered during the lifetime of the grantors 
and that the decree of the Circuit Court of Moultrie 
County is erroneous. The decree is reversed and the 
cause is remanded with directions to that Court to en-
ter a decree in favor of the plamtiff, removing the 
deeds as clouds upon her title and eonfuming the title 
to said premises in her.'' 
See also 16 Am. Jur. 650, Sec. 372, part of which is 
quoted as follows: 
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''A party claiming under a deed is bound to prove its 
execution and delivery, including its acceptance and 
that the transaction was complete before the death 
of the grantor.'' 
See also Supplement 16 Am. Jur. 650. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF DID SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF AND THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY 
FACT AND BY LAW. 
It is a well established point of law that the findings 
of the trial court in respect to a fact situation will not be 
reversed without a clear showing of abuse of discretion on 
the part of the trial judge. If the trial cowt's decision 
can be sustained on a factual point, it will be sustained by 
the Supreme Court on review. Cases in support of this 
position are as follows: 
O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U.2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d 1073: 
"The main contention upon appeal is that there was no 
valid delivery of the deed in question. In reviewing 
this contention, we will keep in mind the fact that the 
trial court found a valid delivery. Since this is true, 
we will not overturn its decision unless it is manifest 
that the trial court misapplied proven facts or made 
findings clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
Wolff v. Fallon (Ca. Dist. Ct. of Appeal) 269 Pac. 2d 
630: 
''It is well established that the ,right to relief from re-
strictive covenants such as those herein depends upon 
the facts of each case. The findings of the trial cowt 
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in such a case are entitled to the same weight as in 
any other case, and if based on any substantial evi-
dence, they are final.'' Strong v. Hlancock, 201 Cas. 
530; 25R P. 60: Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Ca. App. 2d 
201, 207; 206 P.2d 898. 
Key v. McCabe, 356 P.2d 169: 
"There is the sole question presented for determination: 
Is there substantial evidence in the record to support 
the findings of fact set forth above? 
"Yes. The rules is established that when a finding of 
fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any 
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of the ap-
pellate court begins and ends with a determination as 
to whether there is any substantial evidence, contra-
dicted or uncontradicted, which will support the find-
ing of fact. (Primm v. Primm, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 293 
(1), 299 P.2d 231.)" 
In respect to this point, the respondent respectfully 
states to the Court that there are numerous findings other 
than the four recited on Page 7 of appellant's Brief upon 
which the Court based its decision. Other facts that were 
undoubtedly persuasive in this regard were as follows: 
That at the time of executing the deed in question, 
on January 14, 1949, Miss Vest prepared for the decedent 
a bill of sale as to the decedent's automobile, and a power 
of attorney to authorize the attorney to do certain things 
for him. Decedent, after making the deed and bill of sale, 
sold tile automobile, thereby evidencing that he did not in-
tend ownership of the automobile to be transferred at the 
date of the bill of sale, but that he intended to maintain 
ownership and control over it. This docwnent was of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
same nature as the deed, except the deed was to real prop-
erty and the bill of sale was to personaJ. property. 
The intent of the decedent is clearly manifested by his 
action in respect to the personal property. The Power of 
l-\.ttorney, the deed and the bill of sale were nort to be de-
livered except upon the death of William Bates (R. 65.). 
It appears the de€d was testameiJ.tary and there was no 
delivery prior to death. The decedent kept eontrol of the 
property and intended to, except upon condition of death. 
FuTthermore, Miss Vest was not the escrow holder, but 
was merely the custodian. (See Statement of Facts above). 
(R. 75). It seems singularly important that she said, in 
respect to the documents, including the deed, "Those were 
his papers.' (R. 75). Miss Vest at no time looked at her-
self as an escrow holder, but merely as custodian for the 
grantor. For that reason she could not have been any-
thing more than the agent of the grantor and certainly 
not the agent orf the grantee. 
The appellant's strongest case in this argument is the 
case of Lossee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132. We believe that 
case is clearly distinguished from the present case for a 
number of reasons. The authorities indicate that the ques-
tion of delivery is based upon a multitude of :circumstances. 
In the Lossee case the decedent had left her own home and 
went to the home of one of her daughters, who was one 
of the grantees named in the. deeds in question in that suit. 
The mother was 80 years of age. Prior to that time she 
had maintained complete custody and control over the 
deeds. When she delivered the deeds, she delivered the 
deeds to one of the grantees. These are hardly the circum-
stances of the principal case, although the differences may 
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be relatively small, they are, nevertheless, distinct and jus-
tify different conclusions. 
The appellant cites the case of Burnham, et al. v. Esch-
ler, 208 P.2d 96, as supporting this contention. Respond-
ent believes this case is distinct from the principal case, 
in that the grantor in the Burnham case delivered the deed 
to L. R. Eschler, the husband of the grantee, who was the 
agent, not of the grantor, but of the grantee. He, 'himself, 
(L. R. ~chler) had a contingent interest in the property. 
Mrs. Schank, the grantor, made several statements to sev-
eral persons that she had deeded the property away; that 
the property was owned by her niece, Leta, and that the 
property "Had been taken care of." Furthermore, there 
was a long history of gifts from the grantor to the gran-
tee. The grantor had no children and the grantee was 
raised as a child of the grantor. The grantor further sta-
ted that the reason she gave the deed to the husband of 
the grantee was "she didn't want Leta to feel any per-
sonal obligation to her in her lifetime. The grantor never 
attempted or considered changing the deed. The court 
found, under those circumstances, that the grantor deliv-
ered the deed to Mrs. Eschler, the grantee, absolutely with-
out reservation and without intending to reserve any con-
trol over the instrument. This is not the circumstance in 
our case, where the grantor obviously exercised control 
over the instrument, as indicated by his other conduct and 
disposition of the property given in other instruments of 
like import. 
The court, in the Burnham vs. Eschler case, says this: 
"If the grantor reserves control of rthe instrument ·and 
it is subject during ~his lifetime to revocation, no pres-
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ent estate passes to the grantee and the deed is in-
valid for want of delivery." (Authorities) 
"No other intention than that of the deceased to di-
vest herself absolutely of title when she handed the 
deeds to Mr. Eschler can be reasonably deduced from 
the evidence in the principal case.'' 
Respondent respectfully submits to the court that in 
the case at issue, other intent can be reasoMbly deduced 
from the evidence and, in fact, other intent preponderates 
against the defendant. 
The appellant cites as additional authority the case of 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 Pac. 763. 'Ibis 
case also does not stand for the point for which the appel-
lant cites it. In that case, at the time that the grantor 
and the escrow holder arranged to transfer the property 
without the consent of the grantees, both aclmowledged 
that the property was not the grantor's nor the escrow 
holder's, but was the property of the children. All during 
this transaction Gappmayer, the original grantor, and Nel-
son, the original grantee., who eventually by-passed the 
deeds of the children by deeding to the Wilkensons, told 
Wilkenson that the property was the property of the minor 
children and that he, in effect, held the property only as 
escrow holder for the said children. The grantor further-
more never attempted to get the deeds back for his own 
benefit and for his own urposes, but merely for the bene-
fit of the minor children. 
POINT ill 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE GRANTOR 
NEVER DID INTEND A PRESENT, ABSOLUTE AND 
UNCONDITIONAL DELIVERY OF THE DEED AT THE 
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TIME: THAT HE GAVE IT TO MISS VEST AND JUDG-
1\IENT OF TI-IE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUS-
TAINED. 
The appellant has broken his argwnent into three 
points, however, the respondent believes that the issues 
are relatively simple in this case and could be reduced to 
the following questions: 
1. Did the grantor intend a present, absolute and un-
conditional delivery of the deed to the grantee at the time 
he gave the deed to Miss Vest?, and 
2. Was the deed testamentary in character and, there-
fore, inoperative because not executed in accordance with 
the Statute of Wills? 
Sin,ce the second question is necessarily determined 
by the first question, the argwnent can properly be ad-
dressed to both issues at the same time. The test to be 
applied in a case such as this is, did the grantor reserve 
the right to recall the deed from the possession of rthe de-
positary? If he did, then there was no delivery and the 
conveyance failed. The respondent has set forth facts in 
his Statement of Facts which we believe clearly show that 
there was not a present, absolute and ·unconditional grant 
and that the grantor intended to keep possession of the 
house and keep ownership of the personal property, ex-
cept in the event of a contingency, t~wit: Death. The 
facts stated above also show that Miss Vest did not con-
sider herself a trustee or escrow agent of the grantee. She 
felt, on the contrary, that she was the custodian and agent 
of the grantor, and that she ~held only at his instance and 
request. 
The respondent believes that the rule in these cases 
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is simple and is stated in the cases cited by the appellant 
as well as in the cases cited by the respondent. The rule 
is the same in all instances. That rule was enunciated 
quite clearly in the Eschler case cited above by the appel-
lant, the exact quotes from the case being cited by the 
respondent, and by the illinois Court in the Alexander vs. 
American Bible Society Case. The respondent is even im-
pressed with the statement of the law cited by the appel-
lant under Point III and especially in that portion of his 
quotation set forth on Page 11 of appellant's brief as fol-
lwos: 
"However, for either delivery to be effective to pass 
title, the grantor must have surrendered all dominion 
and control over the interest to be 'conveyed. If he 
reserves a power to recall the deed, by word, act, or 
writing, and regardless of whether he ever exercises 
it or not, no delivery has resulted and no transfer oc-
curs. (Citing Singleton vs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 
Pac. 63). 
The question, therefore, reduces itself to the appli-
cation of the rule to the particular fact situation. Appel-
lant has cited a number of cases where under the circum-
stances of those cases the court, in applying the rules set 
forth aJbove, has concluded thaJt the deed was effootive. 
The respondent respectfully urges this Court that in every 
case cirted by the apellant there was a noteable and distinct 
difference between the facts in that case and the one in 
the instant case. The respondent, therefore, cites to the 
Court cases wherein the deed was held ineffective for lack 
of delivery and because it was testamentary in character, 
and cases which the respondent believes are more analo-
gous to the fact situations in ·the instant case. 
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Pendleton v. Kelly, 212 P. 63, (a Utah case). In that 
case, by separate writing, the grantor had manifested an 
intent that the deed was not to be delivered except in the 
event of his death, however, that he reserved the right to 
withdraw or change the same dwing his life. The court 
in that case held: 
"The writing, together with the deed, even though the 
deed was delivered, together with grantor's later con-
duct, proved that the grantor did not intend the deed 
as absolute and unconditional. Therefore, the court 
proprly set the deed aside. This is so even though res-
ervation of a life estate in a deed raises a presump-
tion of an intention on the part of the grantor to make 
an immediate transfer.'' (Emphasis added) 
In the case of First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. vs. 
Burgey (A Utah Case), 251 Pac 2d 297, the Court said: 
"Delivery is essentially a matter of intent, Such in-
tent is to be arrived at from aU the facts and surround-
ing circumstances, both before and after the date of 
the deed, including declarations of the alleged gran-
tor where it appears the declarations are made fairly 
and in the ordinary course of life. (Authorities) The 
testimony reveals that the deceased clearly intended 
that the deed and bill of sale pass the property to the 
defendant. The facts and circumstances, however, 
support the trial court's finding that the deceased had 
no intention to pass title immediately, but that such 
deed and bill of sale were to become operative upon 
the death of the decedent. Under such circumstances 
the deed and bill of sale were clarly testamentary in 
character and intent and were inoperative since they 
did not confonn to the statutory requirements for tes-
tamentary dispositions." In re Alexander's Estate, 
104 Utah 286, 139 Pac 2d 432 (Emphasis added) 
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The Oregon court, in the case of Marquart, et al. vs. 
Dick-Executor, 310 P2d 742, considered this matter. A 
brief summary of that case is as follows: 
FACfS: 
Prior to January 14, 1943, the Marquart Brothers, 
John and Joseph, who had never married, owned four par-
cels of land. On January 14, 1943, they executed recip-
rocal deed to the land. They were executed in the office 
of Frank G. Dick, an atto~ney, with oral instructions to 
hoJd them until the death of one of the grantors, where-
upon the deed to the survivor was to be placed on record. 
John died intestate January 13, 1950. Up to that time 
both brothers possessed the property. The deed to Joseph 
was recorded. Joseph then made a will and left the prop-
erty by will to the Shriners HOspital. Suit is brought by 
heirs of John to set aside the deed. 
ISSUE: 
Was the deed from John to Joseph testamentary in 
character, therefore, inoperative because not executed in 
accordance with the Statute of Wills? 
HELD: 
"* * * The question as to when a deed executed and 
deposited with a stranger, to be delivered to the gran-
tee upon the death of the grantor, is effective to pass 
title, has been subject of much judicial controversy; 
but it is now substantially agreed that its solution de-
pends on whether the grantor intends to and does re-
tain dominion and control over it after such delivery, 
or parts with the possession and control of it abso-
lutely at the time of delivery. In the former case, by 
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the great weight of authority-although the decisions 
are not entirely harmonious - there is no sufficient 
delivery, and the deed passes nothing. But if the 
grantor parts with all dominion and conrol over the 
deed, reserving no right to recall it or alter its pro-
visions, it is a good delivery, and the grantee will, on 
the death of the grantor, succeed to the title." 
"• • • Therefore, the inquiry is simplified by asking, 
did the grantor intend the property to pass? The in-
tention is to be gathered from the words or acts, or 
both, of the maker of the instrument and the sur-
rounding circumstances.'' 
The deed was held invalid because of the ineffective 
delivery. 
This case also stands for the proposition that the gran-
tor's intent at the time of making the deed can be deter-
mined from his after actions and conduct. 
A case which the respondent believes is analogous to 
the principal case is the case of Snodgrass vs. Snodgrass, 
107 Okla. 140, 321 P. 237: 
In that case the grantor executed two warranty deeds 
by terms conveying them to each of two of his adult chil-
dren, Minne E. Pierce and Joyce L. Snodgrass, a separate 
tract of real estate subject to a reservation of a life 
estate to himself. These he deposited with one Jay Col-
lins, who was an abstractor and a loan agent, and not a 
lawyer ,and who had drawn the papers for him. On May 
22, 1915, the same grantor executed a similar deed to 
Rachael Rice, his adult daughter, conveying to her an-
other tract of real estate and depositing the same with 
other papers with Mr. Collins. No instructions were given 
to Mr. Collins in respect to holding these deeds. After the 
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death of Mr. Snodgrass, Sr., an executor was appointed, 
a Will was admitted to brobate which contained a provi-
sion that gave particular sums to residuary legatees. These 
legatees had commenced an action against the executor 
to compel him to bring an action to set aside the deeds on 
the grounds that there was no effective delivery. The trial 
court held in favor of the grantees of the deeds and this 
court reversed the trial court. In reversing the trial court 
it said: 
''Where there is a question as to whether there has 
been a delivery of a deed of conveyance, the real test 
of the intention of the grantor, which intention may 
be manifested by mere acts or by words, or both com-
bined, and such acts and words and the circumstan-
ces relevant thereto are susceptable to parol proof." 
Argument was made that the fact that he did not call 
for the deeds but left them unchanged was evidence of his 
intention to make an effective irrevocaJble delivery. The 
court said: 
"The question we have to decide is not whether he did 
change the deeds, but whether in his lifetime there 
remained in him the power to change them. We see 
no logic in the statement that his failure to take up 
or change the deeds is evidence that he intended to 
part with con"Wol of the deeds when he left them on 
deposit with Mr. Collins. Had these deeds been de-
livered to the grantees when executed or had it been 
made clear to them at that time that these tracts of 
real estate did, at rthe time of the execution of such 
deeds, then become their very own to be of them 
owned subject only to the life estate therein reserved, 
why these grantees could have then and at all times 
thereafter disposed of all of the land during the life-
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time of the grantor. All this, of course, the grantor 
knew. Likewise, if the deeds had been delivered, then 
if, during the years that intervened between the exe-
cution of the deeds and the grantor's death, one of 
the grantees should have died, then the grantor could 
not have changed the deed and the title to the land 
would have passed into the probate proceeding of the 
county court. Of course, apparently not to the lik-
ing of the grantor. * * * *" 
Argument was made that he reserved a life estate, 
which is evidence of a delivecy of the residuary estate. The 
court held: 
"Had the grantor, when he executed these deeds in 
fact intended to reserve control over them in order 
to ·properly meet unforseen contingencies and in or-
der to make certain that the land would be unencum-
bered part of his estate when he should die and had 
merely desired that the deeds, if unchanged by him 
during his life, should merely have testamentary ef-
fect upon ·his death, what thing different would he 
have done than what he did do in this case. * * * * 
Presumptions and burden of proof are worthy of little 
consideration here, because from all of the evidence 
the ultimate conclusion to our mind and conscience 
is irresistable that these deeds never passed beyond 
the grantor's co~trol during his lifetime and were 
never delivered and were not effective while the gran-
tor lived.'' 
CoWlsel cited the case of Anderson v. Mauk, et al., 
67 P.2d 429, Oklahoma. This case comes from the same 
jurisdiction as the Snodgrass case, however, the facts in 
this case are considerably different and not authoritative 
for the proposition for which they are cited by the ap-
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pellant. It is, however, interesting to norte the court also 
said this in the Anderson case, which we believe is the rule 
which should be applied to this case. 
"It is equally well established that if the grantor in-
tends at the time he makes a delivery to the third 
person to retain the lawful right and power to revoke 
or recall the instrument of conveyance, or to there .. 
after control the disposition o[ the same, the transac-
tion constitutes nothing more than an ineffective at .. 
tempt to make a testamentary disposition of the prop-
erty and the deed, not being executed in accordance 
with the Statute of Wills, is ineffective and invalid 
for that purpose. (Authorities)." (Emphasis added.) 
The appellant also cites the case of Wilkerson v. Seib, 
which apparently summarizes the California cases. This 
case does not give the appellant any solace or comfort. 
Tne case is found in the California Supreme Court as a 
result of a dismissal o[ the plaintiff's complaint. The de-
cision was based upon the allegations contained in the 
complaint and the matter was remanded for further ~ 
ceedings, which we presume means trial. The most that 
the Court says in this case is that if the allegations were 
true, as sated in the complaint, there was a complete, !tO-
solute and unconditional delivery of the deed to a third 
party to ho~d in trust for the grantee. The trustee of the 
deed :failed to turn it to the grantee upon the death of the 
grantor and . the property was probated and sold to an in-
ocent third party. The Court does nort conclude that the 
deed per se is valid or invalid, but merely states that if 
the allegations contained in the complaint are true it is a 
basis for trial. This was a proper decision but not au-
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thority for the proposition for which the case is cited by 
the appellant. 
The respondent has traced the California cases sub-
mitted by the appellant and the California rule is not dif-
ferent than the Utah rule. It is merely the application of 
the particular rule heretofore stated to the fact situation. 
California cases can be found both sustaining and reject-
ing the deed. 
For the benefit of the Court for comparison purposes; 
the respondent submits the following case analogies: 
Barnes, et al. vs. Spangler, 25 P.2d 732 (Colorado) 
In this case the grantor, then being of 78 years of age, re-
quested the grantee to come and make a home in his 
premises, operate and manage the same, cook and care 
for him, and then he, in return, would deed to her the 
premises, which constituted apartments and were appar-
ently of sizeable value. She did as he requested. The 
Grantor, outside of the presence of the grantee, made ~and 
executed a Warranty Deed to the premises to the grantee 
and left the deed with the ~change National Bank of Col-
orado Springs, Colorado, with written instructions as fol-
lows: 
''Colorado Springs, Colorado 
"October 20, 1922 
"The Exchage National Bank 
"Colorado Springs, Colorado 
"Gentlemen: 
"I hand you herewith warranty deed dated Octo-
ber 20, 1922, given by me to Vera May Spangler 
conveying residence property situate at 221 North 
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Cascade, Colorado Springs, Colorado, which I shall 
ask you to aocept for safekeeping and deliver 
to Miss Vera M. Spangler in the event of my 
death. 
"Yours very truly, 
"James S. Willard." 
"Dhereafter, on September 21. 1927, the day following 
Willard's death, the bank delivered the said deed to the. 
defendant, who on said date filed the same for record. The 
trial court entered a finding in this case that the said James 
S. Willard, the grantor, constituted the bank as trustee 
for the defendant and intended to reserve no control or 
dominion over the said deed and to divest himself o[ title 
and did, in fact, and in law, reserve no contr.ol or dominion 
over the said deed and intended to and did convey title to 
the defendant in praesenti. Upon appeal the Court said: 
"The test in this case, as in all others where delivery 
is to a third person, is: Did grantor, at the time of 
alleged delivery to bank, intend to part with control 
and make present grant of title without reserving right 
to revoke or recall the deed?" 
"A careful reading of the instructions which accom-
panied the handing of the deed to the depositary dis-
pels any doubt in the writer's mind as to Willard's 
intentions. They were made clear by the instructions. 
He intended delivery to be made after his death and 
said so. Under this writing the bank was Willard's 
agent and possession of the bank and depositary was 
the possession of Willard and the bank could have de-
livered the deed to Willard at any time before his 
death without liability to defendant and Willard could 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
have destroyed it without liability to defendant. The 
instrument could not operate as an escrow on accow1t 
of the lack of sufficient parties and consideration, and 
also the failure to actually contract. It is an indis-
pensible feature of each delivery of a deed that gran-
tor part with possession and control of any power 
over it for the benefit of grantee ·and the grantor's act 
or word must be such as to deprive him of all au-
thority or the right to recall, and must evidence an 
intention to part presently and unconditionally with 
the deed; otherwise there is no delivery.'' 
''The facts do not justify the findings of the trial court 
that there was a legal delivery. Consequently, the 
conveyance attacked by plaintiff in this case is void 
and ineffective and should be set aside. This court, 
on several occasions, determined this question and es-
pecially in Childers vs. Baird, 59 Colorado 382, 148 
P. 854; Harrison vs. Taylor, 83 Colorado 430, 266 P. 
217; Griffiths vs. Sands, 84 Colorado 456, 271 P. 191; 
and the law books present such unanimity of opinion 
that it is useless to make further discussion." 
This ·case and ~the citations cited by the Supreme Court 
of Colorado would seem to be completely opposed to the 
defendant's categoric statement that there are no cases 
to support the position of the plaintiff. 
Compare the language in the written instructions in 
the Barnes case with the oral instructions in the Bates case 
and you will find that they are practically identical. In 
the Bates case he said "In the event anything happens 
to me, you give it to Ted, but I don't want Ted to know 
that you have this instrument, unless something happens 
to me.'' (R. 62). 'r.he deed was not to be delivered until 
he died (R. 66). Miss Vest, on two occasions, retwned the 
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instrument saying: "Willis, I am going away. I would not 
want to take this with me. Perhaps if I leave them they 
will get destroyed. I think you better take care of them 
until I return". He would always bring them back to me 
when I returned. He felt I was custodian of the papers." 
( R. 63) . The evidence clearly shows that Miss Vest mere-
ly was taking care of the papers for safekeeping and not 
as agent fc~ the grantee or as escrow holder. The only 
difference between the oral instructions here and the writ-
ten instructions in the Barnes case, is that the wor.d "safe-
keeping'' was not used in the oral instructions to Miss Vest, 
however, all of the statements surrounding the keeping of 
these papers by Miss Vest indicates it was for safekeep-
ing and for and on behalf of the grantor (R. 75). He 
could have had them back at any time for "those were his 
papers.'' This evidence is unrebutted and unrefuted and con-
clusively shows that between Miss Vest and Mr. Bates the 
papers were his papers and were not delivered for any 
purpose to constitute an absolute grant or unconditional 
delivery. 
Another case whi·oh supports the position of the plain-
tiff herein is the case of Latshaw vs. Latshaw, et al., 107 
N.E. 111 (Illinois). In this case Mary J. Latshaw and her 
daughter, Mary, one ill the plaintiffs herein, went to the 
office of James Marley, who was the circuit clerk and re-
corder of Edgar County, for the purpose of having a deed 
prepared conveying the land in controversy to the plain-
tiffs (two daughters). Marley was a close personal friend 
of the grantor. Marley had the deed prepared, Mrs. Mary 
J. Latshaw executed the deed and handed it to Marley 
with instructions to keep the deed for her and not to re-
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cord it until after her death. One of the grantees named 
in the deed, ·her daughter, Mary, was present during this 
transaction. There was evidence that Mary gave her 
mother $1.00 or other consideration for the said deed, how-
ever, subsequent to the execution of the deed, Mrs. Lat-
shaw requested Mr. Marley to deliver the deed to Mrs. 
Tom Davis, which he did. Apparently the deed was there-
after delivered to the grantor and apparently destroyed. 
The question is whether the transaction constituted a de-
livery. The deed purported to be an absolute conveyance 
of the fee simple title without restrictions or limitations. 
The Court found that there was no valid delivery of the 
deed: 
"The evidence seems to warrant the conclusion that 
it was the intention of the grantor to retain control 
of the deed and the premises until her death for the 
purpose of enabling her, in case she should desire, to 
make a different disposition of the property to do so 
without consulting anyone else. At the time she 
signed the deed she manifestly intended that the gran-
tees should have the land at her death, but she re-
served the right to change her mind, which she did, as 
is evidenced by ~her persistent efforts to repossess 
herself of the deed and its destruction after it came 
into her hands." 
The only difference between this case and the Bates 
case is that ·here the grantor actually received the deed 
back and destroyed it, whereas in the Bates case he did 
not, however, he could have and, therefore, the deeds stand 
in identically the same position. Furthermore, the Bates 
case is strengthened by the nature of the transaction and 
the fact that the grantee never knew that he was 1Jhe gran-
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tee of the said instrument and never assented to the same 
prior to the death of the grantor. Furthermore, the in-
structions in the Bates case and the subsequent conduct 
of Bates gives little doubt that Bates intended to exercise 
and maintain controJ of the said instrument. 
In the case of Linn, et al. vs. Linn, ert al. (Illinois), 
104 N.E. 229, the facts were these: 
The grantor owned a sizeable amount of ground in 
the states of Illinois and Nebraska. He contacted one R. 
W. Aimes, who was a minister of the gospel, concerning 
the preparation of instruments to convey the same to his 
children and inquired of Mr. Aimes how to best accomp-
lish his purpose. Mr. Aimes suggested that deeds be made 
and that the~ be placed in escrow for the purposes of the 
grantor. At the time o[ making the inquiry of Mr. Aimes 
the gvantor, James Ht Linn, asked if it would be possible 
to withdvaw the deeds if he later changed his mind and 
Mr. Aimes stated that he thought it would be possible. Mr. 
Linn thereafter had the deeds made and took them to 
John C. Culbertson, a banker. The deeds were delivered 
in this form: The deed to each grantee was p~aced in a 
separate envelope numbered from one 1Jo six on each en-
velope and on each envelope was endorsed: "James H. 
Linn. ']}his envelope not to be opened during my life." At 
the same time the deeds were prepared the witness pre-
pared a list or paper containing the names of the respec-
tive grantees and a description of the land 1contained in 
the deed to each grantee and these descriptions were num-
bered from one to six to correspond with the numbers on 
the envelopes containing the deeds. This list the witness 
called "1Jhe escrow of the deeds." .It showed who the gran-
tees were and the description of the land conveyed in the 
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deed in each of the envelopes. No further instructions 
were given to Culbertson, the banker. Shortly before the 
death of Mr. Linn and while he was laying on his death-
bed, he directed one of the grantees to a drawer in a bu-
reau in the room where he would find some keys and told 
the grantee to take the keys and go upstairs to the drawer 
named and get a paper, which the father said was a list 
of the deeds he had made. This list was apparently the 
same list that he had previously designated as "the es-
crow of the deeds." The witness testified that his father 
said "When I am dead take them back to Culbertson and 
present them and get your deeds and take them to Pon-
tiac and have them recorded and that will settle it." The 
witness testified he went upstairs but could not find the 
paper so he brought the drawer and its contents down to 
his father and 'his father took the list out and handed it 
to him. This act was, it was 1claimed, intended to be a 
symbolic delivery of the deeds. The Court made the fol-
lowing finding: 
''The following propositions have been settled by re-
peated decisions of this Court: A deed delivered by 
a grantor to a third person for delivery to the gran-
tee upon the grantor's death may be a valid convey-
ance, but it is indispensi:ble in such cases to the va-
lidity of the conveyance that the deed, when delivered 
to the third party, shall pass absolutely beyond the 
dominion and control of the grantor. If there is any 
reservation of control of the deed by the grantor, if 
he merely places it in the hands of a third person as 
a convenient PLACE of deposit, still intending to re-
tain control OVER it himself-it is not a valid deliv-
ery and conveys no title. So long as the deed in the 
hands of the depositary is subject to recall by the 
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grantor, the grantee acquires no right under it and 
if the grantor dies without parting with control over 
the deed, no one has authority afterwards to deliver 
it to the grantee. The circumstances of the delivery 
to the depositary must clearly show the grantor in-
tended the deed to presently become operative. It 
must take effect upon execution and delivery, if at all. 
The intention of the grantor may be evidenced by 
words or by acts, or by barth words and acts, but how-
ever shown it must appear that no control of the deed 
was reserved or intended to be reserved by the gran-
tor after delivering it to the depositary. (Numerous 
citations)." (Emphasis Added) 
"'I'here can be no doubt from the testimony that James 
H. Linn intended that if he died without withdrawing 
the deeds from Culbertson's possession and disposing 
of the land, it should go to the grantees in the deeds, 
but this intention could not prevail if he retained any 
dominion or control orver the deeds and intended to 
reserve the right to make any otheT disposition of 
the land he saw fit to make during rhis lifetime. Such 
an intended disposition of property is ambulatory un-
til the death of the grantor and can only be affected 
by an instrument in writing in conformity with the 
Statute for the disposition of real estate by Will. 
(Authorities) * * * *.'' 
The ·Court found that the delivery of the deed was 
ineffective to pass title. 
The plaintiff believes that there is a case that is iden-
tical from a fact standpoint with the instant case. That 
is the case of Rhines vs. Young, a Washington case, found 
in 166 P. 642. Inasmuch as that case is so similar to the 
instant case from every standpomt, it is set out ·herein 
verbatim: 
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''The plaintiff, Oma Rhines, seeks recovery of 
poosession of certain real property in the City of Ta-
coma from the defendants, William B. Young and oth-
ers, and also to be adjudged the owner thereof as 
against the claims of the defendants. Trial in the ~u­
perior Court for Pierce COWlty resulted in findings 
and judgment in favor of the defendants, from which 
the plaintiff has appealed to this court. 
On November 19, 1949, Mrs. Anna Farrell, the 
grandmother of appellant, was the owner in her own 
right as her separate property of the real property 
here in question. On that day she caused to be pre-
pared by ~her attorney, Mr. C. M. Riddell, a deed ab-
solute in forn1 purporting to ·convey the property to 
appellant. This deed was then signed and acknowl-
edged by her and left with Mr. Riddell with instruc-
tions, as he claims to ·have understood her, to deliver 
it to appellant upon the death of Anna Farrell and 
when satisfactory proof should be furnished him of 
her death. In November, 1912, Mrs. Farrell went to 
Mr. Riddell and procured the deed from him. He 
then voluntarily gave it to her. This was done under 
such cirownstances as to strongly indicate that both 
of them regarded the deed as being at all times in 1his 
possession merely as her agent and at all times under 
her dominion and control without any right or duty 
on his part to hold the same for the exclusive benefit 
of appellant. Mr. Riddell thereafter became of the 
opinion that he had mistaken his duty in surrender-
ing the deed to Mrs. Farrell. Reflecting upon the cir-
cumstances under which the deed was signed, ack-
nowledged, and left with him as he remembered them, 
he became of the opinion that the deed had been de-
livered to him by Mrs. Farrell with intent on her part 
to surrender all dominion and control over it and with 
the vie\v of then vesting title to the property in appel-
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lant, though it was not to be delivered by him to ap-
peUant until after the death of Mrs. Farrell. Neither 
the deed nor the property has ever been in the actual 
or constructive possession of appeHant; Mrs. Farrell 
remaining in possssion of barth the deed and the prop-
erty until the time of her death. Mr. Riddell has 
never been in any sense the agent or attorney for ap-
pellant, unless he was irrevocably made by such by 
receiving the deed from Mrs. Farrell under such cir-
cumstances that it can be held she then surrendered 
all dominion and control oveJ:" it. Mrs. Farrell died in-
testate at Tacoma in Maroh, 1913. Thereafter Wil-
liam B. Young, hell" son and heir, became the duly ap-
pointed and qualified administrator of her estate. Re-
spondent, Martha Young, is the daughter and the on-
ly other heir of Mrs. Farren, ·and the orther respond-
ents ·have acquired an interest in the property as gran-
tees of William B. Young. The property has been 
since the death of lVIrs. Farrell in the possession of 
William B. Young, subject to the interests of the other 
respondents. ~his action was commenced in May, 
1914r resulting in denial of the relief prayed for by 
appellant as above noticed. 
Mr. Riddell is the only witness who testified as 
to what was said and done by Mrs. Farrell at rthe time 
the deed was signed, acknowledged, and left with him 
by 1her. Indeed, he appears to be the only living wit-
ness of what then occurred, he being the notary be-
fore whom Mrs. Farrell acknowledged the deed, and 
also the only witness to the deed signing as such. 
While 1Jhe evidence seems to justify the belief that Mr. 
Riddell honestly believed that he had mistaken his 
duty in surrendering the deed to Mrs. Farrell during 
·her lifetime, and honestly became of the opinion that 
it was left with him by Mrs. Farrell with a view of 
then surrendering all dominion and control over it and 
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having it delivered after her death to appellant, we 
feel constrained to conclude as the trial judge did that 
Mrs. Farrell did not intend to surrender dominion and 
control over the deed by leaving it with Mr. Riddell, 
but left it with him, as she believed, solely as her 
agent with the right on her part at all times exercis-
ing dominion and control over it. The testimony 
given upon the trial touching the question of Mrs. 
Farrell's intention at the time of leaving the deed with 
Mr. Riddell is quite voluminous and much of it in im-
portant particulars in serious conflict. A careful read-
ing of the evidence, however, convinces us, as it did 
the trial judge, that Mrs. Farrell at the time of sign-
ing and acknowledging the deed and leaving it with 
Mr. Riddell and at all times thereafter labored under 
the belief that she had by its signing and acknowledg-
ment in effect made a testamentary disposition of 'her 
property and not an absolute ·conveyance thereof. We 
deem it unnecessary to review the evidence in detail 
here. 
In view of our conclusion touching the question 
of fact as to the intent of Mrs. Farrell in leaving the 
deed with Mr. Riddell, the law of the case seems plain. 
No claim is here made that the signing and acknowl-
edgment of the deed and the leaving of it with Mr. Rid-
dell constituted a valid testamentary disposition of the 
property therein described. Indeed no such claim 
could be successfully made in view of the provisions 
of Section 1320, Rem. Code, prescribing the ·manner 
of making wills in this state. It seems equally plain 
that the signing, acknowledging, and leaving with Mr. 
Riddell of the deed by Mrs. Farrell was not an ef-
fectual conveyance of the property, because of the 
fact that it was not delivered in the sense that Mrs. 
Farrell surrendered dominion and control over it. It 
seems to be well settled law that, while a deed may 
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become effectual to divest an owner executing it of 
title to the property described therein, by delivering 
it to a third person to be delivered to the grantee aft-
er the death of the owner, such delivery by the owner 
to a third person must be such that it becomes abso-
lute and beyond recall by the orwner. Otherwise there 
is in law no delivery o[ the deed to render it effectual 
as such. The rule is stated in 8 R. ~- L. 996, as fol-
lows: 
''']}he rule sustained by the great weight of author-
ity is that the grantor must not only deliver the 
deed to a third person for the benefit of the gran-
tee ultimately, and in some way express his inten-
tion to that effect, but must also part both with 
the possession of the deed and with all dominion 
an d oontroJ o¥er it.'' 
~our own decisions are in harmony with this 
rule. Meik,le vs. Cloquet, 44 Wash. 513, 87 Pac. 841; 
Maxwell vs. Harer, 51 Wash. 351, 356, 98 Pac. 756. 
See note to Munro v. Bowles, 54 L.R.A. 872. 
We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the 
law of the case. The real question here involved is, 
in the last analysis, one of fact, to-wit: What was the 
intention of Mrs. Farrell in signing, acknowledging, 
and leaving the deed with Mr. Ridell? 
The judgment is affirmed.'' 
If the appellant's argument is soW1d, then on Janu-
ary 15, 1949, Edward H. Bates, the grantee of the instru-
ment, ·could have mortgaged the house, could 'have sold 
the property, could have possessed the automobiles and 
personal property and disposed of them, could have exer-
cised all rights that an owner could exercise in the prop-
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erty. By analyzing the transaction from the standpoint of 
&hvard fl. Bates and his claim of absolute ownership of 
the property from January 14, 1949, it seems incongruous 
and unbelievable that such contention could seriously be 
made in light of the circumstances sUITotmding the exe-
cution of this deed and the maintenance, ~control and pos-
ses.4i;iO.:l of the property by the grantor. It is, by the same 
token, just as obvious that the deed, power of attorney 
and bill of sale were an attempt 1by the grantor to make 
a testa1nentary disposition aided by inexpert counsel. Al-
though the grantor's intention may have been meritorious, 
as the lllinois Court stated above, the law has prescribed 
the rule by which documents of this sort must be execu-
ted, which rule, if ignored, would render titles to real es-
tate unstable. If appellant's contention is sound, any deed 
executed by any grantor and delivered to any third party 
is a valid, subsisting and legal deed, unless the grantor 
writes a letter contemporaneously with the execution and 
delivery of the deed, stating that he reserves a right to 
revoke the deed. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully urges the Court to sus-
tain the judgment of the trial court. The respondent re-
spectfully contends that the rule of law applicable to all 
cases cited by both appellant and respondent is the same 
and that the question of whether there is an effective inter 
vivos delivery depends upon the particular facts in each 
case. Respondent respectfully reiterates that the facts of 
this case conclusively show that the grantor, Willis Bates, 
did not intend a present, absolute and unconditional deliv-
ery of the deed to the grantee at the time he gave the deed 
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to Miss Vest, and furthermore, that the deed was testa-
mentary in character and, therefore, inoperative because 
not executed in accordance with the Statute of Wills. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson B. Howard, for: 
HO,WARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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